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PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 
Jenny E. Carroll 
ABSTRACT—COVID-19 has shone a light on the preexisting flaws in the 
criminal justice system. This Essay focuses on one of the challenges the 
criminal justice system faces in light of COVID-19: that of a pretrial 
detention system that falls more harshly on poor and minority defendants, 
swells local jail populations, is fraught with bias, produces unnecessarily 
high rates of detention, and carries a myriad of downstream consequences, 
both for the accused and the community at large. Long before the first 
confirmed case, United States’ jails were particularly susceptible to 
contagions. The COVID-19 crisis exacerbates this problem creating an acute 
threat to the health of those in custody and those who staff our jails. The 
pandemic reveals that even during “ordinary times” the pretrial detention 
system fundamentally miscalculates public safety interests to the detriment 
of both detainees and the communities they leave behind. Simply put, current 
pretrial detention models fail to account for the risks defendants face while 
incarcerated and pit defendants’ interests against the very communities that 
depend on them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of COVID-19 cannot be overstated. As of July 23, 2020, 
the new strain of coronavirus, which causes COVID-19, has infected over 
ten million people, leading to 633,369 deaths worldwide.1 The death toll in 
the United States alone exceeds 125,000.2 On March 11, 2020, the World 
Health Organization officially classified COVID-19 as a pandemic.3 In 
response, governments across the world declared states of emergency and 
urged citizens to distance themselves from one another, a practice now called 
social distancing.4 Schools, bars, restaurants, and entertainment venues 
closed.5 Nonessential workers were ordered to stay at home.6 Group 
gatherings were prohibited7 and the frightened public was told that staying 
 
 1 COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/RE74-JHDX] (updated regularly). 
 2  Daily Updates of Totals by Week and State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6ANQ-NQ4Q] (updated 
regularly). 
 3 WHO Director-General, Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-
on-covid-19---11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/M57R-HE3H]. 
 4 White House Adviser Warned of Risks of Pandemic; Trump Misleads on Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html 
[https://perma.cc/2XCG-86XF] (chronicling the worldwide response to the disease). 
 5 See C.D.C. Gives New Guidelines, New York to Close Restaurants and Schools and Italian Deaths 
Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/coronavirus-live.html 
[https://perma.cc/QD33-PHT7]. 
 6 See Coronavirus: What You Need to Know, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, 
https://www.nga.org/coronavirus/#states [https://perma.cc/D7LC-8TQY] (tracking each state’s orders 
regarding nonessential workers). 
 7 See, e.g., Interim Guidance: Get Your Mass Gatherings or Large Community Events Ready for 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Mass-Gatherings-Document_FINAL.pdf 
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home in isolation is the only way to defeat the virus and “flatten the curve” 
of the infection.8 Even as nations and states begin to “reopen,” fear persists 
that such actions may be premature as infections rates continue to climb9—
and these rates are unreliably low, as access to testing remains elusive.10 
 In the United States, daily briefings from the White House COVID-
19 Task Force stoked the unease. The public was told a vaccine remains 
elusive and distant;11 there is insufficient personal protective equipment for 
healthcare providers12 and insufficient ventilators and hospital beds for the 
infected.13 Medical experts note that while COVID-19 can prove fatal across 
 
[https://perma.cc/F5BV-HAWC] (recommending canceling or postponing gatherings of ten or more 
people).  
 8 Siobhan Roberts, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/science/coronavirus-curve-mitigation-infection.html 
[https://perma.cc/X26P-JY4J]. 
 9 See Ramsey Archibald & Anna Claire Vollers, Alabama Coronavirus Cases Surge to New High as 
State Reopens, AL.COM (May 29, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/2020/05/alabama-coronavirus-cases-
surge-to-new-high-as-state-reopens.html [https://perma.cc/5TB9-ZNHY]. But see Eric Levenson, Nick 
Valencia & Jason Morris, A Month After Reopening, Georgia Coronavirus Cases Continue Slow and 
Steady, CNN (May 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/26/us/georgia-coronavirus/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8WL6-TABP] (suggesting that reopening has not caused a spike, though infection rates 
continue to rise steadily). 
 10 See Sarah Kliff & Julie Bosman, Official Counts Understate the U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/us/coronavirus-deaths-
undercount.html [https://perma.cc/R3ZY-6KHD]. According to the CDC and international epidemic 
experts—based on the characteristics of the COVID-19 virus—“[b]etween 160 million and 214 million 
people in the United States could be infected over the course of the epidemic,” and “[a]s many as 200,000 
to 1.7 million people could die.” Sheri Fink, Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html 
[https://perma.cc/SK8T-LYET]. The overall fatality rate, factoring in demographic and health factors, is 
0.3%–3.5%, “which is 5-35 times the fatality associated with influenza infection.” Declaration for Pers.’s 
in Det. & Det. Staff, Chris Beyrer, MD, MPH, Professor of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
Sch. of Pub. Health (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with author); see also Nick Wilson et al., Case-Fatality Risk 
Estimates for COVID-19 Calculated by Using a Lag Time for Fatality, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE J. 1339, 1340 (2020) (estimating a “broad range of 0.25%–3.0% for COVID-19 case-fatality 
risk estimates”). 
 11 See Zeke Miller, Government Official: Coronavirus Vaccine Trial Starts Monday, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Mar. 15, 2020), https://apnews.com/8089a3d0ec8f9fde971bddd7b3aa2ba1 
[https://perma.cc/A7NM-Y7RG] (explaining that “[p]ublic health officials say it will take a year to 18 
months to fully validate any potential vaccine”); Laura Spinney, When Will a Coronavirus Vaccine Be 
Ready?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/06/when-
will-coronavirus-vaccine-be-ready [https://perma.cc/TD7J-6XNZ]. 
 12 Andrew Jacobs, Matt Richtel & Mike Baker, ‘At War with No Ammo’: Doctors Say Shortage of 
Protective Gear Is Dire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/health/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html [https://perma.cc/AW63-
E44Z]. 
 13  Ken Alltucker & Nick Penzenstadler, Too Many Coronavirus Patients, Too Few Ventilators: 
Outlook in US Could Get Bad, Quickly, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:43 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/18/coronavirus-ventilators-us-hospitals-johns-
hopkins-mayo-clinic/5032523002/ [https://perma.cc/UZH7-HXGD]; Patti Neighmond, As the Pandemic 
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all age ranges, adults over sixty and people with chronic medical conditions 
are especially vulnerable.14 
The nation’s jails carry their own heightened risk.15 Unlike free people, 
detainees cannot engage in “‘social distancing’ and ‘self-quarantine’ and 
‘flattening the curve’ of the epidemic—all of these things are impossible in 
jails . . . or are made worse by the way jails . . . are operated.”16 Inmates in 
jails are often housed in large dormitories or shared cells with poor 
ventilation. They are denied freedom of movement. They eat in large dining 
halls and share shower and toilet facilities. They lack access to adequate 
medical care, soap, cleaning supplies, and personal protective equipment like 
face masks or gloves.17 In addition, a greater percentage of detainees qualify 
as “high risk” for COVID-19 due to age and preexisting health conditions 
than the general population.18 Each of these factors compound the risk for 
infection, severe symptoms, and death. Moreover, these facilities are not 
closed environments. Every day, across the nation, staff come to jails, and 
every day, at the end of their shifts, they return home to their families and 
communities.19 Additionally, as courts across the nation reopen, inmates will 
 
Spreads, Will There Be Enough Ventilators?, NPR (Mar. 14, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/14/815675678/as-the-pandemic-spreads-will-there-
be-enough-ventilators [https://perma.cc/GB6T-KGV7]. 
 14 People with underlying conditions are also more likely to die from the disease; for example, the 
mortality rate for people with cardiovascular disease is 13.2%, 9.2% for those with diabetes, 8.4% for 
those with hypertension, 8.0% for those with chronic respiratory disease, and 7.6% for those with cancer. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 
(COVID-19) 12 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-
mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23CJ-G4UZ]; see also People Who Are at Higher 
Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/specific-groups/high-risk-complications.html 
[https://perma.cc/V93T-BZ4Y]. 
 15 See, e.g., Miranda Bryant, Coronavirus Spread at Rikers Is a ‘Public Health Disaster’, Says Jail’s 
Top Doctor, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020, 10:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/apr/01/rikers-island-jail-coronavirus-public-health-disaster [https://perma.cc/DV6D-ZH5F] 
(estimating the rate of infection in New York City jails at 3.91% compared to the total New York City 
population at 0.5%); Megan Crepeau & Jason Meisner, Cook County Jail Detainee Dies of COVID-19, 
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-cook-county-
jail-death-20200406-42b3dkcqsbeyzflsmso6s2j4wi-story.html [https://perma.cc/3M6V-F534] (reporting 
234 detainees infected at Cook County Jail). 
 16 Jennifer Gonnerman, How Prisons and Jails Can Respond to the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER 
(Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-prisons-and-jails-can-respond-to-the-
coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5TAQ-AH6P]. Homer Venters, former Chief Medical Officer of Rikers, 
explained that “it’s going to be very, very difficult to deliver a standard of care either in the detection or 
the treatment of people who are behind bars.” Id. 
 17 See infra note 100. 
 18 See infra note 85. 
 19 See Cary Johnson, As a Mom Working in a Prison, I Worry About Bringing Coronavirus Home, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/01/as-a-
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leave jails for court appearances, meet with their attorneys and court staff, 
and then return.20 These realities create an opportunity for COVID-19 to 
enter a facility and, once present, to spread to those who are incarcerated and 
all who have had contact with them. The Marion Correctional Institution in 
Ohio offers a chilling case study: An estimated 80% of the detained 
population has tested positive for COVID-19, and health experts warn that 
the contagion has begun to spread to the communities surrounding the prison 
where guards and other staff live.21 
In many ways, the current COVID-19 crisis has revealed a criminal 
justice system that has always been broken and always teetered on the edge 
of some disaster. U.S. jails were particularly susceptible to contagions even 
before COVID-19.22 These were not their only problems, though other 
problems from overcrowding to overpolicing to lack of reentry programs 
have contributed to this susceptibility. A discussion of each of these issues 
is beyond the scope of this brief Essay. Instead, this Essay focuses on the 
pretrial detention system and how the issues with it are exacerbated by the 
current pandemic. 
Part I of this Essay considers the pretrial detention system outside of 
the context of the current crisis. Part II discusses the impact of COVID-19 
on the pretrial detention system and raises the question of what endemic 
flaws this moment of crisis might reveal. It concludes that with or without a 
COVID-19 crisis, the pretrial detention system fundamentally miscalculates 
safety by failing to account for risks to defendants during periods of 




 20 See Jacqueline Thomsen, Judiciary Prepares for Gradual Reopening During COVID-19, but Tells 
Courts to Heed Local Officials, LAW.COM (Apr. 27, 2020, 7:32 PM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/04/27/judiciary-prepares-for-gradual-reopening-during-
covid-19-but-tells-courts-to-heed-local-officials/ [https://perma.cc/JG95-E4Z3] (describing the 
resumption of in-person court appearances in federal courts). Inmates and jail staff are not the only 
vulnerable populations. In Los Angeles, a public defender who contracted COVID-19 after meeting with 
clients has died. Matt Hamilton, Los Angeles County Public Defender Dies from COVID-19, L.A. TIMES 
(May 28, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-28/los-angeles-county-
public-defender-dies-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/56BB-YD97]. 
 21 See Sarah Volpenhein, Marion Prison Coronavirus Outbreak Seeping into Larger Community, 
MARION STAR (Apr. 25, 2020, 4:16 PM), 
https://www.marionstar.com/story/news/local/2020/04/25/marion-prison-ohio-coronavirus-outbreak-
seeping-into-larger-community/3026133001/ [https://perma.cc/S9AZ-MPKT]. 
 22 Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1047, 
1047 (2007). For scientific reports on specific contagions in jails and prisons, see Scientific Reports & 
MMWRs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/correctionalhealth/SR-
MMWR.html [https://perma.cc/4EVQ-KSJU]. 
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communities that depend on them.23 The current public health crisis 
demonstrates in stark terms the interconnected nature of a defendant’s and 
the community’s safety interests. This, in turn, implicates not only due 
process concerns regarding the protection of the detainees’ fundamental 
liberty interests, but also Eighth Amendment concerns about the burdens of 
pretrial detention in the face of a public health crisis and beyond. 
I. THE TROUBLE WITH PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE BEST OF TIMES 
Even during the best of times, the nation’s pretrial detention system has 
been the subject of repeated criticism and reform movements.24 The 
Constitution references pretrial detention only once, prohibiting excessive 
bail in the Eighth Amendment.25 Despite this singular reference, other 
components of due process—such as the presumption of innocence and the 
burden of proof—implicate and support pretrial release. Historically pretrial 
release was the default,26 and the original purpose of bail was to ensure the 
defendant’s presence in court at future proceedings.27 Time and bail reform 
expanded that purpose to focus on the nature of the offense alleged and, later, 
on whether or not the defendant posed a risk to the community if released 
pretrial.28 
These entwined considerations—flight risk and future dangerousness—
make up the modern pretrial release calculation. And, except for defendants 
who are statutorily ineligible for pretrial release,29 courts can only impose 
pretrial conditions on a defendant upon a finding that it is necessary to 
mitigate the risk identified by the state.30 Determining when release is 
 
 23 See infra Section II.B. 
 24 See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 599–606 (2017) 
(describing community bail fund organizing efforts). 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 26 See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 33 (providing that “bail shall be admitted[] except where 
the punishment may be death”); SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE 
LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (2018) (noting that denying bail in 
noncapital cases was historically seen as a denial of the presumption of innocence). 
 27 See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (explaining that “[a] recognizance of bail, in a 
criminal case, is taken to secure the due attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to 
submit to a trial, and the judgment of the court thereon”). 
 28 This shift began in earnest in the 1940s and progressed through the 1980s with the passage of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739–43 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253, 253 (1984); BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 19–27. 
 29 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 30 See id. at 746–47; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1951); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION 
STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARD 10-1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/cri
mjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk/ [https://perma.cc/2THN-5Y8C] (explaining how courts should 
undergo pretrial release decisions). This is not to say that courts are the only actors who may affect pretrial 
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appropriate and what that release will look like is a multistep predictive 
balancing act. 
Courts first weigh the defendant’s liberty interests against the state’s 
prediction of flight risk or dangerousness if the defendant were to be 
permitted to remain free while awaiting trial.31 To do this, courts use 
predictive proxies to determine the probability that the defendant will pose a 
risk if released and to determine what conditions, if any, might mitigate that 
risk.32 Increasingly, courts rely on pretrial assessment tools (PSAs) to 
calculate this probability.33 Like their human counterparts, PSA 
determinations attempt to predict future behavior based on known and 
knowable information such as the nature of the alleged offense, the 
defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s ties to the community as 
evidenced by work history or residence, and the defendant’s criminal 
history.34 Courts are then left to balance the defendant’s interest in freedom 
against the predicted risks the defendant poses if released pretrial. The 
process is imperfect at best and catastrophic at worst. 
Moreover, though financial incentives and constitutional and statutory 
mandates should minimize pretrial detention, there is a disconnect between 
the articulated goals of the system and the reality of how it works. High rates 
 
release decisions. As noted, legislators may designate particular offenses or defendants as ineligible for 
bail. In addition, discretionary decisions by police, sheriffs, and prosecutors may also affect pretrial 
detention. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2017). 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f) (2012). 
 32 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 865–
71. 
 33  Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61 (2017); Megan Stevenson, 
Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 344–45 (2018). These PSAs utilize 
algorithms to determine the probability that a defendant will either fail to appear or pose a danger if 
released. See Eaglin, supra, at 64; Stevenson, supra, at 304–05. Risk assessment tools were originally 
touted as decreasing the influence of bias in pretrial decision-making, yet, as will be discussed next, recent 
critiques of such tools suggest that they promote the very bias they were designed to eliminate. See, e.g., 
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019) (arguing that predictive 
techniques are inherently unequal and racialized). 
 34  Kate Patrick, Arnold Foundation to Roll Out Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Nationwide, INSIDE 
SOURCES (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.insidesources.com/arnold-foundation-to-roll-out-pretrial-risk-
assessment-tool-nationwide/ [https://perma.cc/GA4B-TYYQ]. These factors are consistent with those 
used by courts in making pretrial detention decisions. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131 (explaining that 
“the court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the penalty provided by 
law; the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . the defendant’s past and present conduct, 
including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court 
proceedings; the nature and probability of danger that the defendant’s release poses to the community; 
[and] the source of funds used to post bail”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 (providing that “the bail authority shall 
consider all available information as that information is relevant to the defendant’s appearance or 
nonappearance at subsequent proceedings, or compliance or noncompliance with the conditions of the 
bail bond, including information about:” the nature of the offense, the defendant’s employment, the 
defendant’s ties to the community, and whether the defendant complied with the relevant conditions). 
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of pretrial detention contribute to jail and prison overcrowding35 and strain 
county and community resources that are often stretched perilously thin 
already.36 The following Sections will, in turn, discuss the due process 
concerns, inherent biases, and problematic downstream consequences that 
make the problem worse. Though COVID-19 has certainly exacerbated 
issues inherent in the pretrial detention system, the system was deeply flawed 
from the start. In many ways, the current public health crisis has simply laid 
bare the troubling and devastating reality of a broken system.  
A. The Due Process Problems with Pretrial Hearings 
The Supreme Court has required a nexus between the state’s articulated 
interest and its proposed condition of release or detention in federal pretrial 
detention hearings.37 Under this rule, if a federal court makes a finding that 
a defendant poses a flight risk or presents a danger to the community if 
released, it can set conditions necessary to mitigate that risk without running 
afoul of the Due Process Clause.38 
The problem with this due process analysis is multifaceted. Setting 
aside the question of whether federal due process analysis is even applicable 
to state pretrial detention hearings, such hearings—including those in federal 
courts—lack many of the robust procedural safeguards of a trial.39 These 
hearings tend to be remarkably short—often less than two minutes in 
length—and, in state court, may occur prior to appointment of counsel for a 
 
 35 Margaret Elizabeth Sparks, Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail 
Systems and Their Continued Use Throughout the United States, 52 GA. L. REV. 983, 1004 (2018) 
(explaining that pretrial detainment leads to “the overcrowding of jails”). Pretrial detainees are more 
likely accept a plea deal than a released defendant. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, 
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14 
(2017). Pretrial detention also likely worsens case outcomes by hindering the defendant’s ability to 
prepare his defense. Id. 
 36  Alexi Jones, Does Our County Really Need a Bigger Jail?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 2019), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailexpansion.html [https://perma.cc/S5S4-UPEY]; Natalie Ortiz, 
Pretrial Population and Costs Put County Jails at a Crossroads, NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES (June 29, 
2015), https://www.naco.org/articles/pretrial-population-and-costs-put-county-jails-crossroads-0 
[https://perma.cc/PR8V-ZZ76]. 
 37 See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990); United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). While the Court has established 
process requirements in the context of federal proceedings, it has provided little guidance as to whether 
or not such protections are also constitutionally mandated for state systems. Kellen Funk, The Present 
Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1098, 1107 (2019). 
 38 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–52. 
 39 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 109; Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial 
Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1353–55 (2012); 
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 428 (2011). This is not 
to say the defendant enjoys no procedural protections, but it is to say that these protections are 
significantly curtailed at the pretrial detention stage. See Appleman, supra, at 1353–55. 
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defendant.40 The absence of counsel and the brevity of these hearings raises 
significant questions regarding the level of rigor courts employ in 
considering whether to impose detention.41 
Arguably, the actuarial analysis of PSAs has rendered such brief 
hearings sufficient. PSAs, after all, offer an efficient analysis of probable 
risks.42 Such an argument, however, overlooks the reality of how PSAs 
actually work. PSAs are static in their analysis and susceptible to economic 
and racial bias.43 They fail to account for voices outside of their constructed 
consideration and they assign a permanent meaning to factors they consider 
without context.44 To PSAs, a criminal history signals danger, rather than 
hard times, hopelessness, or police harassment,45 and a failure to appear 
signals a flight risk, rather than competing obligations or the lack of 
economic resources that render missed work a financial catastrophe rather 
than a mere inconvenience.46 While PSAs may represent an efficient means 
to collect data and assign it some meaning, they cannot and should not 
replace human analysis and the context human analysis can provide. 
Alternatively, one might argue that a brief and unrepresented pretrial 
hearing—even one that lacks procedural protections and fails to fully 
consider risks and the potential mitigation of those risks—is sufficient given 
the brevity of pretrial detention. Such an argument assumes that speedy trial 
clocks will indeed limit periods of pretrial detention.47 This assumption is 
belied by the reality that modern pretrial detention periods often extend to 
nearly a year and are sometimes longer than, or as long as, any sentence 
imposed.48 
 
 40 See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 37 (2019); Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn 
Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2002) (observing that pretrial detention hearings in Baltimore City 
with counsel lasted “on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus one minute [and] forty-
seven seconds without counsel”). 
 41 See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21–32 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Dorothy Weldon, 
More Appealing: Reforming Bail Review in State Courts, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2401, 2420–21 (2018). 
 42 Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305. 
 43 See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2259; Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305. 
 44 Stevenson, supra note 33, at 314–17. 
 45 See id. at 317–18. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See 130 CONG. REC. 1821 (1984) (statement of Senator Grassley) (noting that the Speedy Trial 
Act would prevent lengthy periods of pretrial detention); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 677, 739 n.310 (2018). 
 48 See PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS 
OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 5 (2018), 
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Another problem with this due process analysis is that defendants often 
operate at a distinct disadvantage in pretrial proceedings. Prior to making a 
charging decision, the state, through police investigation, has had the 
opportunity to amass evidence that a newly charged defendant has not.49 This 
not only means that a defendant, even one represented by counsel, will be at 
a distinct disadvantage, but also that the prosecutor assumes an outsized role 
once she makes a decision to charge a defendant. This is because both PSAs 
and courts rely on the prosecutor’s allegation or charge as a factor to guide 
pretrial risk calculations.50 Defense counsel, if present, may refute an 
allegation; however, fear of self-incrimination may counsel against robust 
defense participation—especially if defense counsel has had little time to 
speak to the defendant prior to the pretrial hearing. Further, if the prosecutor 
can establish probable cause exists for a charge that precludes bail, the 
prosecutor can literally control the bail proceedings through charging 
discretion.51 And once a pretrial detention decision is made, federal and state 
procedural rules often preclude reconsideration of detention or the conditions 
of release absent a demonstration of a change in circumstances not apparent 
at the time of the original determination.52 
Finally, pretrial detention often occurs not because of a genuine risk of 
flight or future dangerousness, but because a defendant is unable to satisfy 
conditions of release. A defendant may lack the money for bail.53 Or they 
may be unable to comply with nonmonetary conditions of release because 
they lack funds for electronic home monitoring (EHM), access to mental 
health or substance counseling, or stable housing located a sufficient distance 
from a complaining witness.54 In making a finding that some condition will 
sufficiently mitigate the risk the defendant poses, courts may permit pretrial 




 49 See BAZELON, supra note 40, at 37. 
 50 See supra note 33. 
 51 One could argue that it is the legislature, not the prosecutor, controlling this aspect of pretrial 
decision-making. And, in part, that is true. However, given that prosecutors frequently choose between 
and among charges as part of permissible (and even desirable) prosecutorial charging discretion, it is 
more accurate to consider such legislative designations as merely creating opportunities for prosecutorial 
control of the pretrial detention process. 
 52 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (providing a judge may reopen a pretrial detention question 
only when there is new evidence that is material to the decision of whether detention is appropriate). 
Admittedly, COVID-19 might constitute such a new condition. 
 53 Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1652–53 (2020). 
 54 Jenny E. Carroll, Beyond Bail, 73 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33–34) (on file 
with author). 
 55 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(B)(iv), 3146 (permitting restrictions on travel to prevent flight 
risk); id. § 3142(g) (permitting courts to set conditions of release to mitigate risk to the community). 
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However, the courts often engage in little consideration of the 
defendant’s ability to meet the conditions—monetary or otherwise.56 In other 
words, a defendant may be held pretrial not because they pose some 
insurmountable risk, but because they are too poor to meet the conditions of 
their release or because resources, such as treatment beds or secure housing, 
do not exist for them. Thus, in practice, the balance of risk required by due 
process is superseded by structural barriers that are unrelated to the 
defendant’s supposed flight risk or dangerousness. 
B. Bias 
Accusations of bias in the criminal justice system are neither new nor 
unique to pretrial detention.57 Overpolicing of poor and minority populations; 
disproportionate rates of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions; and inequity 
in sentencing all translate into higher rates of pretrial and posttrial detention 
among marginal populations.58 Bias by early decision-makers fuel these high 
rates of detention.59 
Bias in pretrial decision-making has long been the subject of critique.60 
Early pretrial detention reformers argued that judicial discretion increased 
detention rates among poor and minority defendants because judges often 
failed to consider indigency, and so they often set bail and conditions of 
release that marginal defendants could not meet.61 These early reformers 
 
 56 Carroll, supra note 54, at 28–29. 
 57 See, e.g., Edward Green, Race, Social Status, and Criminal Arrest, 35 AM. SOC. REV. 476, 476–
77 (1970) (describing bias in arrest rates between 1942 and 1965). 
 58 See Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1185–87 
(2012). 
 59 See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 200–10 
(2013). It is also worth noting that each early actor may not engage in decision-making equally. Judges 
may defer to police and prosecutors in assessing risk, either explicitly in the form of hearings that 
emphasize evidence in support of the charge, or implicitly as the relationship between pretrial hearing 
judges and law enforcement fosters reliance. The Supreme Court has urged court deference to police in 
the Fourth Amendment context, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and scholars have noted such a 
deference in the context of credibility assessments. See, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption 
of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2017). Additionally, rules of procedure often promote 
deference to prosecutorial decision-making by requiring or allowing courts to consider both present and 
past charges in making pretrial detention decisions. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 (providing that “the 
bail authority shall consider all available information as that information is relevant to the defendant’s 
appearance or nonappearance at subsequent proceedings, or compliance or noncompliance with the 
conditions of the bail bond, including information about:” the nature of the offense, the defendant’s 
employment, the defendant’s ties to the community, and whether the defendant complied with the relevant 
conditions). 
 60 In the 1960s, the Vera Institute argued that judges in New York City were overdetaining poor and 
minority defendants based on miscalculations of the risk that they would fail to appear at future court 
dates. See WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 2–11 (1976). 
 61 Id. 
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argued that courts could reduce bias by analyzing a series of known factors, 
such as criminal history and community ties, that could assess the risk a 
defendant might pose if released with reasonable accuracy.62 They argued 
that, through this method, unnecessary conditions including bail could be 
avoided and release rates would increase.63 The wide adoption of these 
proposed reforms—including the Bail Reform Act of 1966—led to 
increasing rates of pretrial release, but the shift was short-lived.64 The 1980s, 
with the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and its state analogs, saw 
another reversal in pretrial policy with a renewed embrace of money bail and 
outright detention of individuals pretrial.65 Since then, rates of pretrial 
detention across the nation have continued to rise and to disproportionately 
affect poor and minority populations.66 
In response, actuarial risk assessment tools were introduced to reduce 
arbitrary and inaccurate calculations of risk by decreasing the amount of 
discretion in pretrial release decisions.67 Such tools generate a risk 
assessment score for each defendant, which is then used by a court, or the 
legislature, to set the criteria for release.68 A defendant who receives a low 
score is unlikely to pose either a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the 
community and may be released. In contrast, a defendant who receives a high 
score may pose a greater risk and merit detention.69 By shifting pretrial 
assessments away from judges toward machine-generated evaluations, 
advocates hoped the bias that had long plagued pretrial detention processes 
would be mitigated. It was not. 
Despite the promise of accurate and neutral findings, risk assessment 
tools quickly displayed the same bias as the system they sought to improve.70 
There are different possible explanations for these results: The PSAs may 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 20–22. 
 64 BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 23–25. 
 65 Id. at 25–26. 
 66 See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventative Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing 
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 515 (1986); Baradaran, supra note 59, at 184–85, 
193. 
 67 Gouldin, supra note 47, at 713; see also text accompanying notes 42–46 (discussing how these 
risk assessment tools work). 
 68 Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 494–95 (2018). 
 69 For a discussion of how risk scores are calculated and the significance of risk scores, see BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 
(2010). 
 70 See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Mayson, supra note 68, at 508–10; Stevenson, supra note 
33, at 344–45. 
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carry their own embedded biases71 or they may be susceptible to user bias 
through inconsistent interpretation of risk assessment scores.72 Coupled with 
the lack of information about how such scores are generated, these risk 
assessment tools have done little to mitigate inherent biases in the pretrial 
detention process.73 In the end, despite multiple reform movements, poor and 
minority defendants are still more likely to be subjected to pretrial 
detention.74 
C. The Downstream Consequences of Pretrial Detention 
Even in the best of times, the line between pretrial detention and 
punishment has always been a murky one. While the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly drawn a boundary between detention that punishes and detention 
which merely promotes compelling state interests prior to trial,75 significant 
downstream consequences of even brief periods of pretrial detention render 
the practice effectively punitive.76 
In custody prior to trial, accused people not only suffer the “ordinary” 
indignities of jail, they also lose wages, homes, child custody, and the 
opportunity to meaningfully assist in their own defense.77 They are also are 
less likely to receive mental health and addiction treatment and are more 
likely to plead guilty to their charges.78 These downstream consequences of 
pretrial detention affect the defendants as well as their communities. The 
community a defendant leaves behind during pretrial detention not only loses 
one of its own, but also loses all of the benefits of that defendant’s presence. 
In custody, defendants do not earn a wage to support their families or pay 
their rent. They are absentee parents, partners, and mentors. Whatever 
 
 71 See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Mayson, supra note 68, at 508–10; Stevenson, supra note 
33, at 344–45. 
 72 See Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305, 327–33. 
 73 See Eaglin, supra note 33, at 94–97; Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Julia Angwin et al., 
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
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 74 See Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 
9, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ [https://perma.cc/MC7J-B639]. 
 75 See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 747–48 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). 
 76 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 82–91; Heaton et al., supra note 35, at 713–14; Crystal S. Yang, 
Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417–27 (2017). 
 77  Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 53 GA. L. REV. 235, 241, 246–47, 277–279 
(2018); see also Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/PB6X-5GD2] 
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 78 See Heaton et al. supra note 35, at 722. 
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investment they have made in their community prior to their detention is 
halted or limited while detained.  
Moreover, pretrial detention serves to disrupt and destroy the very ties 
between defendants and their communities that might, in the long run, 
protect and promote community safety. In this way, what the Court declines 
to refer to as punishment may nonetheless feel punitive to those who suffer 
it.79 
II. COVID-19 AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
Whatever failings the pretrial detention system suffers in the best of 
times are further complicated by COVID-19. Detention in the face of a 
pandemic skews the calculation of the liberty interests at stake and alters 
incentives for pretrial actors. In the midst of a public health crisis, pretrial 
detention determinations raise more than the possibility of confinement, 
indignity, and the downstream consequences described above; these 
decisions raise the possibility that a person will be exposed to a known fatal 
contagion as a result of an accusation. Beyond this, closures of courts in the 
wake of the public health crisis80 raise the specter that speedy trial rights will 
no longer serve (if they ever did) as a backstop to indefinite periods of 
pretrial detention.81  
This Part will discuss each of these issues in turn. Section II.A begins 
by explaining why jail populations are more susceptible to contagions, 
leading to the conclusion that defendants should be released pretrial rather 
than detained. Section II.B then explains how pretrial decision-makers fail 
to adequately weigh defendants’ liberty and safety interests in making their 
detention decisions, using COVID-19 as a lens through which to show how 
fundamentally flawed these pretrial detention calculations are. Section II.C 
builds upon this discussion by arguing that the calculation also 
misunderstands the community’s interests in pretrial release. Altogether, 
these complications suggest that an alternative calculation of pretrial 
detention is necessary—a calculation that recognizes that pretrial release 
may in fact promote public safety. 
 
 79 See Appleman, supra note 39, at 1336; Carroll, supra note 54, at 12. 
 80 Jacob Gershman & Byron Tau, Coronavirus Disrupts U.S. Court System; Trials Are Delayed and 
Courthouses Are Limiting Public Access Across the Country, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-disrupts-u-s-court-system-11584445222 
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 81 See Simone Weichselbaum, Can’t Make Bail, Sit in Jail Even Longer Thanks to Coronavirus, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/can-t-
make-bail-sit-in-jail-even-longer-thanks-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/4SWR-CSB8]. 
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A. Jails and Contagions 
Even before the current health crisis, the conditions of the nation’s jails 
and prisons rendered their occupants susceptible to contagions in ways that 
members of the free world were not.82 Jails and prisons are infamous for 
overcrowding and lack of medical care.83 In 2016, the DOJ issued two reports 
on the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) confirming these concerns in federal prisons, 
finding that BOP experienced chronic medical staff shortages and failed to 
take adequate measures to address them.84 
In many ways, local jails fare worse when it comes to medical care and 
contagion control. First, jails are composed of pretrial detainees and 
individuals on parole or probation violation holds, which means that jail 
populations fluctuate more than prison populations as inmates move in and 
out of the facilities.85 Second, “the [healthcare] crisis is particularly acute in 
jails” as those booked into jail often enter in a state of medical or emotional 
distress and may require monitoring or specialized care that jails lack the 
resources to provide.86 The proliferation of private jail management that 
 
 82 Bick, supra note 22, at 1047. 
 83 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICES FOR THE 
NORTHERN, MIDDLE, AND SOUTHERN DISTS. OF ALA., INVESTIGATION OF ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS 
FOR MEN 8–12 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1150276/download 
[https://perma.cc/EZ5C-SUU4] [hereinafter ALABAMA NOTICE] (noting chronic overcrowding in 
Alabama prisons); Glenn Ellis, Examining Health Care in U.S. Prisons, PHILA. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2017), 
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/examining-health-care-in-u-s-prisons/article_43520055-789e-52a9-
aed5-eaf1c75c7c36.html [https://perma.cc/FAP8-ZRKB]; see also Talha Burki, Prisons Are “In No Way 
Equipped” to Deal with COVID-19, 395 LANCET 1411, 1412 (May 2, 2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930984-3 
[https://perma.cc/S2A9-WEHX] (explaining how jails and prisons are unprepared to cope with the 
medical needs of prisoners during the COVID-19 pandemic); Laura Hawks, Steffie Woolhandler & 
Danny McCormick, COVID-19 in Prisons and Jails in the United States, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Apr. 
28, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2765271 
[https://perma.cc/TU5S-TKXN] (same). 
 84 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS’ MEDICAL STAFFING CHALLENGES (2016). This deficiency led to problems meeting the medical 
needs of prisoners. Id. The DOJ also reported that BOP facilities and services, including medical services, 
were particularly inadequate to meet the needs of an aging prison population. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF PRISONS (2016). State prison facilities fare no better. See, e.g., ALABAMA NOTICE, supra note 83, at 
1, 8–9. 
 85 Steve Coll, The Jail Health-Care Crisis, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019) 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/the-jail-health-care-crisis [https://perma.cc/Y5XE-
V3NN]; Lipi Roy, Infections and Incarceration: Why Jails and Prisons Need to Prepare for COVID-19 
Now, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lipiroy/2020/03/11/infections-
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[https://perma.cc/JQ6P-X2M2].  
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prioritizes profit over care has heightened this problem.87 A 2019 CNN 
exposé of one such management company reported that, “[a]cross the 
country, the same themes have been found: doctors and nurses [in jails] have 
failed to diagnose and monitor life-threatening illnesses and chronic 
diseases . . . allow[ing] common infections and conditions to become 
fatal.”88 The result is “prolonged suffering, ongoing complications, shortened 
life expectancy and debt” among jail populations.89 Publicly managed jails 
suffer similar deficiencies. For example, in 2018, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) declared the medical program at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail 
unconstitutional.90 The report noted that inmate requests for medical care 
were ignored or not taken seriously by jail staff, resulting in serious harm or 
death.91 
In turn, this lack of medical care within jail facilities taxes local 
communities. Inmates, unable to receive adequate medical care in jail, may 
present at local hospitals for emergency treatment.92 Jails, unable or 
unwilling to bear the financial burden of treatment, may also release inmates 
untreated, burdening already strained local communities.93 
Contagions compound problems created by inadequate medical care. In 
jail, detainees share spaces such as toilets, laundry, and meal facilities.94 The 
close and shared quarters render social distancing impossible, allowing 
infections to spread more easily.95 Poor air circulation,96 high rates of older 
and medically compromised individuals,97 the treatment of hand sanitizer as 
 
 87 See Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, ‘PLEASE HELP ME Before it’s Too Late,’ CNN (June 25, 
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 88 Id. 
 89 Id.  
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 93 See id. 
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contraband,98 and the lack of access to personal hygiene or sanitizing 
products99 all further susceptibility to infection. 
Lack of medical care and contagion-friendly environments in jails are 
troubling in the best of times; in the face of the current health care crisis these 
circumstances combine to create a high-risk roulette in which inmates, 
unable to practice best the preventative guidelines, await infection and, for 
some, death. 
Practitioners, activists, and scholars across the nation have renewed 
their call for detention reform in light of the current COVID-19 crisis.100 The 
response has been mixed. While some jurisdictions have failed to release 
inmates,101 others have released those close to the completion of their 
sentences, those held as a result of administrative probation or parole 
violations (such as failure to make curfew, failure to check in with a parole 
or probation officer, or failure to pay a fine), and those detained for 
nonviolent or misdemeanor offenses.102 For example, six counties in North 
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Carolina affirmed that they will release detainees charged with “low-level 
offenses” after an individual review confirming that “release does not 
constitute a public safety concern.”103 Still other jurisdictions have adopted 
“cite and release”104 or non-policing policies with regard to nonviolent 
misdemeanors.105 Finally, some have offered alternative forms of detention, 
including release to a family member, house arrest, or EHM.106 
District attorneys have also weighed in on the debate. Some have voiced 
support for these temporary reforms, hailing them as an appropriate balance 
between law enforcement and public health.107 Others have been less 
supportive—urging aggressive policing,108 seeking continuances in pending 
criminal cases while opposing pretrial release,109 and advocating that certain 
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considerations for Cook County jails). For data on release rates across multiple institutions, see 
Monitoring Jail Populations During COVID-19, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/projects/covid-
19-criminal-justice-responses/covid-19-data [https://perma.cc/G3KG-4UE5]. 
 103 Jordan Wilkie, UPDATED: Coronavirus Raises Health, Legal Concerns for NC Jails, CAROLINA 
PUB. PRESS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://carolinapublicpress.org/30039/coronavirus-raises-health-legal-
concerns-for-nc-jails/ [https://perma.cc/J7TM-AH43]. 
 104 A cite and release policy allows a police officer to issue a citation or ticket to an offender in lieu 
of arresting him or her. Similarly, nonpolicing policies allow police departments to simply deprioritize 
enforcement of some minor offenses. Even if the police are aware that the offense occurred, they will 
either decline to investigate it, or decline to arrest the suspected offender. Both policies tend to be limited 
in scope—often affecting only misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses—and both reduce pretrial 
detention by never placing a suspect within the jail system. A recent example of this was the decision in 
New York City to not arrest those suspected of simple possession of marijuana. Benjamin Mueller, New 
York Will End Marijuana Arrests for Most People, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/nyregion/nypd-marijuana-arrests-new-york-city.html 
[https://perma.cc/JG7X-GLGY]. 
 105 See, e.g., Liz Kellar, Cite and Release, not Jail, for Some over COVID-19 Concerns, UNION (Mar. 
18, 2020), https://www.theunion.com/news/cite-and-release-not-jail-for-some-over-covid-19-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZNW-LZAA]; Nichole Manna, Fort Worth Police Will Give Citations for Low-Level 
Crimes Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/coronavirus/article241254951.html [https://perma.cc/7YP8-
S2A5]. 
 106 See, e.g., Lucas Wright, Amy Fleming Now on House Arrest Due to COVID-19, 8 NEWS NOW 
(May 1, 2020, 9:16 PM) https://www.8newsnow.com/news/local-news/amy-fleming-now-on-house-
arrest-due-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/6DLS-JBP3]. 
 107 See, e.g., Coronavirus Latest: Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Urges Leaders to Reduce Prison 
Populations Due to COVID-19 Pandemic, CBS NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:29 PM), 
https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/03/19/coronavirus-latest-philadelphia-da-larry-krasner-urges-
leaders-to-reduce-prison-populations-due-to-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/3SKD-4DBY]. 
 108 See, e.g., Andrew Mark Miller, Police Groups Slam Cities and States Releasing Jail Inmates to 
Mitigate Coronavirus Fears, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 21, 2020, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/police-groups-slam-cities-and-states-releasing-jail-
inmates-to-mitigate-coronavirus-fears [https://perma.cc/SWE6-T6Z4]. 
 109 See, e.g., David J. Mitchell, DA Hillar Moore: State Prosecutors Seeking Orders, Bill to Suspend 
Criminal Legal Deadlines, ADVOCATE (Mar. 16, 2020, 11:31 AM), 
115:59 (2020) Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19 
77 
people remain detained because they are less able to comply with CDC 
handwashing and social distancing guidelines.110 For their part, federal 
district courts have ordered release in the face of overwhelming infection 
rates.111 
The scope of the crisis within the criminal justice system has become 
increasingly apparent as the number of confirmed cases and deaths grow. 
Pretrial detainees already make up a disproportionate segment of jail 
populations,112 where they face potential exposure to a fatal contagion. In 
this, the COVID-19 crisis highlights failures inherent in the determinations 
made by the pretrial detention system, most notably the inability to properly 
assess the competing interests at stake in determining whether to detain an 
individual. In leaving prisoners to the care of the county jail systems, 
defendants and their communities are left vulnerable to COVID-19.113 
B. Detainees’ Constitutional Interests in the Crisis and Beyond 
In making pretrial detention decisions, various actors weigh the interest 
of the defendant in pretrial release against the state’s interests in safety, 
reducing the risk of flight and, for later pretrial actors, fiscal burdens 
associated with detention. This consideration, however, fails to account for 
risks a defendant may face in custody, which raises both due process and 
Eighth Amendment concerns.114 
Turning first to the risks a defendant faces during pretrial detention, 
admittedly, the Bail Reform Act and its state law analogs do not specifically 




 110 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, New Orleans Prosecutors Argue the Coronavirus Is a Reason to 
Keep People in Jail, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 4:28 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/new-
orleans-prosecutors-jail-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/AWQ4-NAC6]. 
 111 See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D. Ohio filed Apr. 22, 2020) 
(granting partial habeas relief in the form of release for inmates at the Elkton Federal Correctional 
Institution in light of COVID-19). 
 112 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551 
(2012). 
 113 The concerns noted above are not the only concerns that arise out of the COVID-19 crisis in the 
context of the criminal justice system. From a constitutional perspective, detainees suffer denial of speedy 
trial and jury rights, a lack of access to counsel now excluded from jails, and the risk of cruel and unusual 
conditions of punishment if detained following conviction. This Essay touches on some of these concerns 
briefly, though without the full attention they deserve. 
 114 While fully unpacking each of these is beyond the scope of this Essay, I can recommend a reading 
list for anyone who wants one, but I would start with Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 
128 YALE L.J.F. 1098 (2019), and Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643 
(2020). 
 115 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (2012). 
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lower courts have recognized health and safety claims relating to pretrial 
detention in contexts outside of the Excessive Bail Clause,116 the Supreme 
Court has provided little guidance as to what conditions of release or 
detention might violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
by creating too great a health or safety risk to a pretrial detainee.117  
The Court has, however, provided guidance regarding the health and 
safety risks to detainees in other contexts. For instance, the Court has 
employed the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit “barbarous punishment.”118 This includes prohibiting 
prison officials from failing to provide medical care,119 behaving with 
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates,120 or knowingly 
exposing inmates to serious and communicable diseases.121 At their core, 
these cases recognize that even during periods of incarceration, the detainee 
maintains an interest in safety from physical harm.122 
 
 116 Miranda v. County of Lake arguably comes closest to addressing cruelty in the context of pretrial 
detention. 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). In Miranda, the court recognized a claim brought by the estate 
of Lyvita Gomes, who was detained for failing to report for jury duty. Id. at 341. During her confinement, 
Ms. Gomes refused to eat or drink, and jail medical officials simply monitored her in her cell as she grew 
increasingly weaker. Id. By the time she was transported to the hospital, her condition was beyond 
treatment, and she died of dehydration. Id. at 341–42. The court allowed the claim to go forward under 
the post-conviction line of cases despite the fact that Ms. Gomes was a pretrial detainee. Id. 
 117 The Court has tied the analysis of “excessiveness” to the Due Process Clause, finding that bail 
(or more accurately the lack of bail) is neither excessive nor punitive so long as the decision to detain is 
reasonably related to the an articulated and compelling state interest, a point reiterated by Justice Scalia 
in his Kingsley v. Hendrickson dissent. 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)) (explaining that “if the condition of confinement being challenged 
‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may 
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment’”). In Bell, the Court also noted that if 
extreme overcrowding amounts to punishment, that too might violate a pretrial detainee’s liberty interests. 
441 U.S. at 535. 
 118 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). In Estelle, the Court recognized an inmate’s civil 
rights claim after he was denied adequate medical care following an injury sustained while “performing 
[his] prison work assignment.” Id. at 98. In drawing this analogy, I recognize that the Court has indicated 
that bail is not meant to be a punishment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding 
that pretrial detention does not violate the Fifth or Eighth Amendments); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (holding 
that pretrial detention may not be punitive). 
 119 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. 
 120 Id. at 104. 
 121 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In Helling, the Court recognized McKinney’s claim 
that the prison’s failure to protect him from environmental tobacco smoke violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by posing an unreasonable risk to his health. 
Id. at 35. 
 122 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737–38 (2002). In Hope, the Court held that handcuffing Hope 
to a hitching post for prolonged periods of time constituted cruel and unusual punishment not only 
because it failed to promote any penological purpose, but because it demonstrated that the prison officials 
acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmates’ health or safety.” Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 
503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). 
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While this may not obligate the state to provide optimal medical care, 
the state may not ignore the medical needs of detainees, particularly critical 
medical protection.123 In Brown v. Plata, the Court explained that a prisoner 
“may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A prison that 
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is 
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized 
society.”124 The current crisis brings the Court’s reasoning directly into play. 
For detainees who are not outwardly sick, adequate medical care means 
having the ability to abide by social distancing and isolation guidelines, 
having the ability to wash their hands frequently and carefully, and having 
access to medical professionals to assess the severity of potential 
symptoms.125 It also means access to protective face masks, as the CDC has 
recommended all people wear face masks when social distancing guidelines 
cannot be met.126 For those who are experiencing severe symptoms, it means 
access to adequate medical professionals, hospitals, and perhaps even 
ventilators.127 Thus, while punishment may infringe on a detainee’s personal 
liberty, the infringement must not include exposure to contagions or denial 
of medical care.128 While Brown v. Plata involves punishment as opposed to 
pretrial detention, it would seem odd that a detainee should have more rights 
after conviction than before. Rather it seems clear that a pretrial detainee, 
like post-conviction detainees, has a liberty interest in physical safety during 
periods of pretrial detention.129  
Certainly, detainees held as flight risks as opposed to those considered 
unsafe should be eligible for release, as concern that a defendant will not 
return to a future court date cannot and should not outweigh the detainee’s 
 
 123 See id. 
 124 563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011). 
 125 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IF YOU ARE SICK (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/sick-with-2019-nCoV-fact-sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HKW9-T2GY]. 
 126 Recommendation Regarding the Use of Cloth Face Covers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 
3, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover.html 
[https://perma.cc/RFK3-EQ4L]. 
 127 Coronavirus: What Are Ventilators and Why Are They Important?, BBC (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52036948 [https://perma.cc/J5ME-MXJ5]. 
 128 The key point is that if we recognize these rights post-conviction, surely they also hold for 
individuals who have not yet been convicted. 
 129 Pretrial detainees’ Eighth Amendment protections are, perhaps, less expansive than one might 
expect, but their liberty interest is greater. The Court’s decision in Salerno confirms this, holding that 
there is a higher standard for detention when depriving pretrial detainees of liberty (by, say, moving them 
to solitary confinement or taking away privileges) than there is when depriving prisoners of the same 
liberty. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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liberty interest in remaining alive and healthy.130 This argument seems 
particularly salient in light of overwhelming infection rates present in jail 
facilities.131 In many jails, infection rates remain obscure due to lack of 
testing.132 Still, new cases in jails appear daily.133 As the Court has noted in 
the context of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, detention facilities must accommodate the basic human need of 
reasonable safety.134 For many detained in jails across the country, such a 
reasonable guarantee of safety is impossible during this pandemic. 
To be sure, questions about pretrial release in the face of COVID-19 
raise broader logistical questions. Not all pretrial detainees are the same—
some pose different levels of risk in terms of safety or flight, and some have 
few resources that might ensure their own safety upon release. These 
differences, however, can be addressed in terms of the release decisions 
themselves and conditions of release. Some jurisdictions have limited release 
to those accused of nonviolent offenses or have placed conditions on release, 
including home monitoring, curfew requirements, or maintaining residence 
in a particular jurisdiction.135 
Discussion of release in the time of COVID-19 also highlights a more 
fundamental issue—the lack of support services for marginalized individuals 
regardless of a health care epidemic. As courts purport to base release 
decisions on factors such as a detainee’s ability to return to employment, 
 
 130 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, No. 6:19-mj-00087-MK, 2019 WL 3037042, at *1, *3 (D. Or. 
July 10, 2019) (holding that a defendant charged with violation of the Mann Act and possession of child 
pornography who suffered from diabetes, heart conditions, and open sores should be released on home 
detention because of his medical conditions); United States v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that a defendant with AIDS who was charged with murder should be released on bail 
given the “unacceptably high risk of infection and death on a daily basis inside the MCC”). 
 131 See Bryant, supra note 15; Crepeau & Meisner, supra note 15 (describing infections rates at 
Riker’s Island and Cook County jails). These infection rates are consistent with those in prisons. See 
Volpenhein, supra note 21 (reporting infection rates as high as 80% at the Marion Correctional Institute 
in Ohio). 
 132 See, e.g., Eddie Burkhalter, Less Than 1 Percent of Alabama Inmates Have Been Tested for 
COVID-19, ALA. POL. REP. (May 29, 2020), https://www.alreporter.com/2020/05/29/less-than-1-
percent-of-alabama-inmates-have-been-tested-for-cov [https://perma.cc/ES49-3GNF]; Elise Schmelzer, 
22 Inmates at Denver’s Two Jails Under Observation After Showing Coronavirus Symptoms, None Have 
Been Tested, DENVER POST (Mar. 20, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/20/denver-
jail-coronavirus-observation/ [https://perma.cc/RBH4-HHPZ]. 
 133 See, e.g., COVID-19 Infection Tracking in NYC Jails, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://legalaidnyc.org/covid-19-infection-tracking-in-nyc-jails/ [https://perma.cc/3ET4-PCWV]. 
 134 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
 135 See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Dan Morse & Spencer S. Hsu, As Inmates in D.C., Maryland and 
Virginia Test Positive for the Coronavirus, Jail Officials Scramble to Reduce the Risk, WASH. POST (Apr. 
1, 2020, 7:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/as-inmates-in-dc-maryland-
and-virginia-test-positive-for-the-coronavirus-jail-officials-scramble-to-reduce-the-
risk/2020/04/01/b0d9cfd8-7363-11ea-85cb-8670579b863d_story.html [https://perma.cc/EFU2-JPTU]. 
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education, or even a stable home, the lack of jobs, exclusion from school 
upon arrest, inequities in education opportunities, widespread housing and 
food insecurity, lack of mental health facilities, and lack of addiction 
treatment facilities in marginal communities become a pathway to the 
criminal justice system, a basis to detain, and an impediment to release. This 
is clear in a time of crisis, but it is equally clear that one cannot have a 
conversation about meaningful pretrial detention reform (or criminal justice 
reform), without addressing the reality that we use our jails and prisons to 
house the very people that we fail to support in other contexts. 
C. Considering Safety and Communities in Crisis 
When weighing the interest of the defendant in pretrial release against 
the state’s interests in safety, pretrial actors consider the defendant’s interests 
as distinct from the community’s interests protected by the state. Yet, the 
recognition of a detainee’s interest in safety squarely raises questions about 
how “community safety” is calculated, both in terms of which communities 
count for this calculation and, more fundamentally, why a defendant’s 
interests are separated from the community’s in pretrial decision-making. 
These are linked inquiries and they are inquiries made simultaneously more 
visible and more complex in the context of COVID-19. 
The current health crisis confirms, in ways previously obscured or 
ignored, that a defendant’s community is shifting and multifaceted. A 
defendant may call a particular community his home, but during periods of 
detention the community he shares contact with includes jail staff. Fully 
contemplating community safety in this time of crisis, therefore, requires 
consideration of the risk pretrial detention may pose to those people a 
detainee comes into contact with as a product of his detention. Put another 
way, a COVID-19 outbreak in a jail affects not only those detained, but jail 
staff and their families.136 The calculation of community safety during this 
public health crisis must therefore shift to consider more effects on 
communities than simply a defendant’s predicted risk of future 
dangerousness. 
Beyond this, the current crisis highlights the false dichotomy promoted 
by the pretrial detention system between the defendant’s liberty interests and 
 
 136 Infection among jail staff makes this plain. See, e.g., Bernadette Hogan, NY State Prison Guards 
Beg Cuomo to Protect Workers from Coronavirus, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2020, 4:53 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2020/03/30/ny-state-prison-guards-beg-cuomo-to-protect-workers-from-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/8L2Y-A7DE] (noting that fifty-six New York correctional officers tested positive for 
the virus); Deanna Paul & Ben Chapman, Rikers Island Jail Guards Are Dying in One of the Worst 
Coronavirus Outbreaks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rikers-
island-jail-guards-are-dying-in-one-of-the-worst-coronavirus-outbreaks-11587547801 
[https://perma.cc/EY6B-673H]. 
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the community’s safety interests. Prosecutors and courts tend to focus on the 
community interest in the defendant’s detention, rather than the threat a 
defendant may face if detained or the community interest in keeping the 
defendant out of custody.137 Yet, the Court’s decisions with regard to 
punishment suggest at least a shared constitutional concern over the 
detainee’s safety while in custody and the community’s interest.138 Even if 
one does not believe the community has an interest in a detainee’s safety 
during ordinary times, it certainly does now, given the threat of COVID-19. 
For inmates, the threat of infection while detained during this time of crisis 
is high.139 For the community, there is an imperative to reduce the rate of 
infection among all populations.140 In order to accomplish this goal of 
reduced infection rates, the community has an interest in maintaining the 
health and safety of vulnerable populations—including those made 
vulnerable by lack of medical care or ability to comply with safety 
precautions as a result of pretrial confinement. In this way, the interest in the 
safety of the inmate and the community align. 
This alignment is even more apparent when we consider that detainees 
are released daily regardless of what pretrial decisionmakers do. The 
majority of jailed detainees don’t have life sentences.141 They serve a term of 
imprisonment (often as pretrial detainees) and are released (assuming they 
survive). Others are acquitted or have their charges dropped.142 Some are 
detained for short periods before their bail hearings and then released. While 
a full discussion of the reality of this cycle of reentry is beyond the scope of 
this Essay, the fact that it exists further underscores the need for sensible 
pretrial decision-making during this time of crisis. As jail populations move 
in and out of facilities and back to their communities, they carry with them 
contagions from their places of incarceration. The failure to enact sensible 
policies that preserve inmate safety create avoidable community risk 
regardless of the point of release. 
 
 137 See Gouldin, supra note 32, at 891–92. 
 138 See supra notes 117–18. 
 139 This claim is true for all defendants, but particularly those who fall into high-risk categories: the 
elderly, immunocompromised, and pregnant. 
 140 See Roberts, supra note 8 (explaining that reducing the number of COVID-19 cases overall is 
essential so that hospitals and other necessary responders are not overwhelmed). 
 141 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FACTS OF LIFE SENTENCES (2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Facts-of-Life.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K7TU-6VJJ]. 
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Moreover, when considering public safety concerns pretrial decision-
makers tend to speak in terms of the public as one body and the defendant as 
another—as if a defendant lives in complete isolation without a community 
or family of his own.143 The “community” requires protection from the 
defendant—his past criminal record, or his lack of resources or a home, 
counseling toward some lurking future danger from which the court must 
insulate the community.144 This calculation, however, makes assumptions 
about the community that often fail to take into account the community’s 
own perceptions of the risk the defendant poses or the hardship that the loss 
of the defendant may produce in the lives of those around him.145 In fact, the 
community interest in safety is often not separate from the defendant’s, but 
entwined with it. This is not to say that in every case the community is better 
off when a defendant is released, or that every member of the community 
may benefit or suffer in the same ways when a defendant is detained, but it 
is to say that separating a defendant’s and a community’s interest may fail to 
properly appreciate the complex dynamics of “community safety.” 
The COVID-19 crisis heightens the potential harm of detention and 
highlights the importance of calculating community safety in terms that take 
the defendant into account—not only as a matter of the defendant’s safety 
but as a matter of the community’s. The current public health crisis raises the 
hard question of whether detaining a defendant for any period creates so 
significant a communal risk that community safety counsels toward release 
in all but extreme cases. This risk presents itself in multiple scenarios: A 
detained defendant may never come home, and their community may suffer 
the long-term effects of their permanent absence. Or, if left to linger in a 
highly susceptible jail facility, the detainee may bring the contagion back to 
the community, creating a new infection source. Or, an outbreak in a jail 
might send sick and dying detainees to already overtaxed hospitals, creating 
further resource scarcity in an already overburdened system.146 In any of 
these scenarios, pretrial release becomes a means of preserving not just the 
defendant’s health and safety but the community’s. Likewise, fiscal concerns 
may counsel toward release as a means to reduce overcrowding not only in 
jails, but in medical facilities. 
 
 143 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
249, 251–52, 255 (2019) (describing this phenomenon in the context of prosecution). 
 144 See Gouldin, supra note 32, at 850; Mayson, supra note 33 at 2221, 2281; Mayson supra note 68, 
at 495 n.18, 523–24, 568. 
 145 See Carroll, supra note 54, at 11. 
 146 See, e.g., Connor Sheets, Alabama Prison System’s COVID-19 Plan Anticipates Widespread 
Infection, Deaths, National Guard Intervention, AL.COM (Apr. 5, 2020), 
https://www.al.com/news/2020/04/alabama-prison-systems-covid-19-plan-anticipates-widespread-
infection-deaths-national-guard-intervention.html [https://perma.cc/EG7Q-2GEX]. 
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For pretrial decision-makers, these public safety concerns coupled with 
the financial implications of closed courts, prisons declining transfers from 
local jails, infection risk for inmates and jail staff, and rising costs of medical 
care all counsel towards a reconsideration of the risks a defendant’s release 
poses. 
Despite these claims, one response might be for courts to decline to 
release any defendant once detained as a way to stop the virus from spreading 
to the community. Indeed, this argument has been floated by state 
prosecutors and police as an appropriate response to COVID-19, and by DOJ 
as a necessary component of the current state of emergency.147 On April 1, 
2020, BOP locked inmates in their cells for two weeks in hopes of halting or 
slowing the spread of COVID-19 in an already compromised system.148 
Some local actors have followed suit, declining to release pretrial detainees 
citing public safety concerns.149 
Such a plan follows a particular logic: if you fear that the virus will 
spread rapidly in jails and may be undetectable in some of those infected,150 
detaining all persons indefinitely will effectively insulate the remaining 
population from any risk of infection. This logic, however, ignores the 
Court’s own doctrine on pretrial release—a doctrine that presumes freedom 
as a default and detention as a last resort.151 It runs contrary to fundamental 
constitutional principles that the accused do not forfeit all rights in the face 
of arrest, detention, or even a pandemic and the fear it generates. 
 
 147 See Betsy Woodruff Swan, DOJ Seeks New Emergency Powers Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, 
POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/21/doj-coronavirus-
emergency-powers-140023 [https://perma.cc/RYA2-WSAX]. Congress has pushed back on this request 
but will likely grant some additional powers. Riley Beggin, DOJ Asks Congress for Broad New Powers 
amid COVID-19. Schumer Says, “Hell No.,” VOX (Mar. 22, 2020, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/3/22/21189937/coronavirus-department-justice-doj-
powers [https://perma.cc/KTB4-4Y4T]. 
 148 Anastasia Tsioulcas, Prisoners Across U.S. Will Be Confined for 14 Days to Cut Coronavirus 
Spread, NPR (Mar. 31, 2020, 8:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/03/31/824917318/prisoners-across-country-will-be-confined-for-14-days-to-cut-
coronavirus-spread [https://perma.cc/QB6T-BBSR]. 
 149 See, e.g., Alice Speri & Akela Lacy, Louisiana’s Coronavirus Plan for Prisons Could Create 
Death Camps, INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/04/07/louisiana-
coronavirus-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/S7EK-BPGE]. 
 150 See Jing Cai et al., Indirect Virus Transmission in Cluster of COVID-19 Cases, Wenzhou, China, 
2020, 26 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1343, 1343, 
1345 (2020); Melissa Healy, How ‘Silent Spreaders’ Are Fueling the Coronavirus Pandemic, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 17, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-03-17/how-silent-spreaders-are-
fueling-the-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2A6M-LH2H] (both noting asymptomatic carriers 
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Taken to its extreme, it is a logic that would dictate that a defendant 
should continue to be held even after completing a sentence. If that feels 
unsustainable as a matter of policy or humanity or constitutionality under the 
Eighth Amendment (and, spoiler alert, it should), then it should feel equally, 
if not more, unsustainable in the context of pretrial detention in which a 
defendant has not even been convicted. It is a logic that transforms any 
possible period of detention into a death sentence, both for the detainee and 
for those who work in our jails, and that ignores the reality that even those 
already exposed to the virus are less likely to infect others if they self-isolate 
rather than remain incarcerated in crowded and unsanitary conditions. 
It is also a logic that will tax already strained medical facilities. As 
Governor Andrew Cuomo laments the lack of hospital beds and ventilators 
in the state,152 and inmates at Rikers Island are offered $6 an hour to dig 
graves,153 the impact of mass infection in jails and prisons is starkly apparent. 
As of July 23, 2020, the Marshall Project reported 70,717 cases and 681 
deaths in prisons.154 In a closed environment with no opportunity for effective 
social distancing, infection and mortality rates will continue to rise. For 
medical facilities this translates to the introduction of even more patients into 
a system that is already overburdened.155 
A system that defaults to detention to house, feed, and treat the 
marginal—whether through indefinite and lawless detention in this time of 
crisis or finite detention beyond—is destined to create a carceral cycle that, 
in the end, fails us all. A continued system that imagines an all-or-nothing 
proposition in which the most vulnerable among us must either be detained 
pretrial or be released without support, and in which the interest of our 
community is diametrically opposed to that of the accused, is likewise 
unsustainable and cruel. Instead, in the face of this crisis and beyond we 
should recognize what is surely and fundamentally true: a defendant is part 
of the very community pretrial decisionmakers seek to preserve and protect. 
The borders of that community may shift and change, but what does not 
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change is the reality that a defendant’s detention will create a void in that 
community that may well value his presence and his life. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay began as a warning. In the face of a burgeoning health crisis, 
it sought to chart a path forward in which pretrial detainees might be released 
rather than remain in custody while the infection spreads throughout the 
nation’s jails. In the weeks of its writing, this Essay has borne witness—like 
so many others—to the awful collision between the criminal justice system 
and COVID-19. In New York, one of the epicenters of the crisis, officials 
moved to release many inmates, including pretrial detainees.156 And yet, 
among those remaining, COVID-19 infection rates are nine times the rate of 
the free population.157 As confirmed cases and deaths mount, the prediction 
of the susceptibility of incarcerated populations has proven horrifically 
accurate. 
Of course, the current COVID-19 crisis did not break the pretrial 
detention system. The system has long suffered all the cracks and 
deterioration of a system built on inequity and injustice. The crisis, however, 
highlights the failings of the system in new ways. The overcrowding in jails 
that makes the spread of COVID-19 so likely highlights how many are held 
in jails not because they present a true risk but because they are poor, targeted 
by discriminatory laws and policing practices, unable to make bail, pay for a 
condition of release, or simply have nowhere else to go.158 
Pretrial detention is not the only aspect of the criminal justice system 
affected by COVID-19. As the crisis has heightened, procedural safeguards 
within the system have collapsed. Court closures have delayed trials, 
suspended jury rights, and delayed appellate processes.159 Closed jails have 
excluded not only in-person visitation of family members but also access to 
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in-person meetings with counsel.160 Sentenced defendants are facing risks not 
contemplated at the time of sentencing, raising Eighth Amendment concerns. 
Finally, court decisions to sentence even in the face of the epidemic subject 
defendants to unnecessary and unwarranted risks in the name of business as 
usual during a time that is anything but usual. 
Like pretrial detention, COVID-19 did not break these systems. 
Failures in the criminal justice system are heightened by the crisis, but they 
will persist long after a vaccine is found and COVID-19 becomes a historical 
event. However, in highlighting these problems on a national scale, this crisis 
presents an opportunity for reform. Most fundamentally, it offers an 
opportunity to recognize that those detained within the system are not 
isolated or forgotten populations but are linked to our larger community. It 
is an opportunity to recognize that as our nation moves forward, we must 
think of safety and liberty interests not just in terms of those best able to 
weather this crisis through the inconvenience of self-isolation and limited 
supplies, but in terms of how the most marginal among us will weather this 
storm. It is an opportunity to question the system and its daily inhumanity. 
And, in the end, it is a chance to bring about meaningful change. 
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